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Gettysburg College
Abstract
This theoretical paper studies the issue of fiscal transparency, which we define as asymmetry
of information between the households’ perception of fiscal policy and the actual government
balance sheet, in the context of a 24-hour news cycle. We model the economy using the New
Keynesian three-equation model to study the effect of fiscal transparency on output, inflation,
and especially government debt in order to draw conclusions that are relevant in the realm
of policy-making in a sovereign debt crisis scenario. We find that a higher degree of fiscal
transparency leads to greater levels of output and inflation as well as higher government
debt.
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1. Introduction
This paper theoretically analyzes how the government’s transparency with regards to
its fiscal position affects output, inflation, and especially public debt. We choose these
three variables because they are mostly representative of the economy and they allow us to
capture most of the effects of fiscal transparency on economic outcomes. Moreover, these
three economic outcomes are the most present in the existing literature. This has to do with
the notion that the effects of fiscal transparency on the real economy are mostly indirect,
which means that choosing other outcomes, such as employment or the capital stock, may
lead to far-fetched conclusions about their relationships.
Transparency in regard to all government activities is a cornerstone of a democratic
society, as the people elected to public office have an obligation to keep their constituents
informed to ensure that they are acting in their best interest. It is in fact not a coincidence
that authoritarian regimes are known to give a distorted version of the truth, or even to
outright lie, to their own citizens to make sure that they do not question the government’s
behavior. In the last two to three decades households have been able to retrieve important
fiscal policy information from the media, thanks to the existence of a 24-hour news cycle,
as the activities of governments in developed countries have been under a great degree of
scrutiny. In particular, one of the topics which most news outlets spend a lot of time covering
is government debt and fiscal policy. However, given the relatively infinite amount of channels
through which individuals can obtain this information, they sometimes end up forming fiscal
policy opinions that deviate from the government’s actual fiscal position (Bernoth and Wolff,
2008). One of the greatest issues that arise with the existence of such a large number of
news outlets has to do with how they each interpret an official government announcement,
especially when it is not a transparent one. This issue has had the attention of global
financial markets especially since the 2016 Presidential Election and the rise of the fake news
phenomenon across most developed countries.
The principal issue that we investigate is how fiscal transparency (or lack thereof, referred
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to as fiscal opacy) affects market expectations of future fiscal policy. In particualr, we
assume that both the government itself and media outlets make an announcement on the
current status of fiscal policy which allows markets to form beliefs on future fiscal policy
outcomes. Intuitively, if the media’s announcement is close enough to the government’s,
then the government is being relatively transparent with regard to its fiscal position, and
vice-versa otherwise, and is thus able to conduct expansionary fiscal policy and efficiently
allocate money to meaningful projects. We hypothesize that fiscal opacy generates non-
trivial uncertainties in the economy that cause households to act sub-optimally and expect a
smaller fiscal stimulus then they otherwise would, therefore leading to lower income, inflation,
and government revenue.
In this paper we model the economy using the New Keynesian 3-equation model to
study the impact of this specific issue on output, inflation, and government debt. The vast
majority of the papers that have been written are empirical ones, so this paper’s contribution
is to study a heavily-researched topic using a new theoretical approach. Our results from
comparative statics analysis are consistent with our hypothesis and provide a theoretical
backing for the existing quantitative findings. Specifically, they agree with the works of
Galois and Wei (2002) and Teig (2006), Sargent and Wallace (1989), and Bastida et al.
(2015) in that a lower degree of uncertainty on fiscal policy, generated by a relatively more
transparent government, has beneficial effects across the economy: total output and inflation
increase, thus suggesting positive economic outcomes, and government debt also increases,
caused by the government’s higher revenue and a greater degree of freedom to implement
the fiscal stimuli that it intends to.
The remainder of the paper is as follows: in section 2 we place the topic of fiscal trans-
parency in the existing economic literature; in section 3 we set up the theoretical model; in
section 4 we solve the model and analyze the results by conducting comparative statistics;
section 5 is the conclusion.
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2. Literature Review
As we mentioned above, the existing literature abounds of studies on the effect of govern-
ment transparency on economic outcomes. It is further divided into two separate categories,
fiscal transparency and interest rate transparency. This theoretical paper fits inside the first.
The literature, most of which is empirical, shows evidence that fiscal transparency is gen-
erally associated with a better economic outcomes, good governance, and more democratic
(Fukda-Parr et al., 2011; Kopits and Craig, 1998). Furthermore, countries with low levels of
fiscal transparency tend to be low-income, authoritarian regimes, and located in parts of the
world with ongoing internal and international wars (Guillamon et al., 2011). The asymmetry
of information generated by a non-transparent government causes a suboptimal outcomes
because of wasteful and inefficient government spending (Persson et al., 1997). Heald (2003)
is one of the few papers that claim that fiscal transparency is not always beneficial, arguing
that an “overexposure” to government budgetary information may lead to some inefficiencies,
political polarization, and high maintenance costs.
Since a lot of papers study the effect of fiscal transparency on output and inflation at
the same time, we cover them simultaneously. Wehner and Renzio (2010) and Baldrich
(2005) both find non-trivial positive relationships between fiscal transparency and GDP per
capita. Similar works study the same relationship through a third outcome. Gelois and
Wei (2002) find that lower fiscal opacity increases confidence in international investors, and
therefore foreign direct investment, which leads to higher levels of GDP and inflation rates.
Sargent and Wallace (1989) claim that fiscal transparency is closely tied to a well-functioning
monetary authority. Especially in countries that adopt inflation targeting or that operate
under high government debt, fiscal transparency is of fundamental importance: it puts
pressure on interest rates and the money supply, and thus inflation levels. Teig (2006) finds
a negative relationship between a transparent government and the level of corruption, as
his result show statistically significant evidence to correlate corruption and output. Benito
and Bastida (2009) study a sample of 41 countries, developed and developing ones, and find
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that higher fiscal transparency leads to higher voter turnouts and a decreased budget deficit,
which then in turn translates into better economic outcomes, including output per capita.
The empirical work of Montez and Lima (2018) shows a negative relationship between fiscal
transparency and inflation, which they attribute to lower economic volatilities. They argue
that the effect of inflation volatility on inflation expectations is stronger than the positive
externalities of a more transparent government, thus resulting in an overall decrease in
inflation. They find that this effect is stronger in developing countries and countries whose
central bank adopts inflation targeting.
With regard to the effects of fiscal transparency on government debt, Bernoth and Goff
(2008) empirically study the effects of creative accounting on interest rate spreads between
bond yields in European countries; they find that a higher degree of fiscal transparency
reduces risk premia, a result which they attribute to the relatively lower influence that
a government announcement has on financial markets’ beliefs regarding the current fiscal
position. Wang et al. (2012) study the same relationship by mimicking the work of Duffie
and Lando (2001), but they edit their asset density function with added positive bias; they
find that low fiscal transparency, which they refer to as fiscal opacity, increase credit spreads
non-linearly. Alt and Lassen (2006) study a cross-section off 19 countries in 1999 to study the
impact of fiscal transparency on the government deficit; they show that fiscal transparency
ensures better fiscal outcomes when the size of the debt is small enough, less than 1% of GDP,
but they are unable to come to the same conclusion in countries that have large outstanding
public debt.
In the existing economic literature numerous fiscal transparency papers study it quanti-
tatively by exploiting the notion of creative accounting. Creative accounting is a government
practice strategically implemented to lead individuals to form beliefs on fiscal policy that
differ from its actual fiscal position. Von Hagen and Wolff (2006) show some European coun-
tries in the midst of a sovereign default crisis tend to utilize stock-flow adjustments, a form
of creative accounting, to hide budget deficits. This phenomenon is particularly prevalent to
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circumvent the EU regulation named Stability and Growth Pact, whose very primary goal
is to constrain government behavior. Milesi-Ferretti (2000) theoretically studies what types
of environments lead governments to engage in creative accounting practices. She finds that
when the publicly-available budget is not transparent to begin with governments are more
likely to trade off a, costly, fiscal adjustment in favor or creative accounting. Unsurprisingly,
Koen and van den Noord (2004) show that the more binding fiscal rules are the more likely
a government is to adopt fiscal gimmicks.
Every paper mentioned above is an empirical one, whereas this paper takes a theoretical
approach to study the effect of fiscal transparency on output, inflation, and government debt.
To the author’s best knowledge, there does not exist a study that analyzes these relationships
using the New Keynesian 3-equation model. Hence, our most significant contribution is that
we theoretically model fiscal transparency using the notion of creative accounting.
3. Model
We adopt the framework of the New Keynesian 3-equation model and analyze fiscal trans-
parency in a similar fashion to how the existing literature models central bank transparency
(Blinder, Ehrmann, Fratzscher, De Haan, Jansen, 2008; Poutineau, Sobczak, Vermandel,
2015). The model consists of three equations, each specifying the three variables of interest:
output, inflation, and government debt.
We start off by introducing the notion of fiscal transparency. The works of Koen and van
der Noord (2005), von Hagen and Wolff (2006), and Milesi-Ferretti (2000) show evidence to
argue that governments regularly engage in creative accounting practices to booster their
fiscal position and mislead financial markets. Once the government makes an official an-
nouncement regarding its fiscal position, we can write
Ft − F officialt = CAt (1)
where CA = c+ c. We assume that investors know c, the average usage of creative account-
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ing, and that they do not know the true fiscal position of the government. Ft is the actual
fiscal position and F officialt is what the government says it is. Combining the two, we have
Ft − F officialt = c+ c ⇒ F officialt + c = Ft −  (2)
where  is normally distributed with mean 0 and standard deviation ρ. Let F˜ officialt = F
official
t +
c. After the government makes an official announcement regarding its fiscal position, there
is a second announcement, done by news outlets and other agencies that closely follow
government activities. This is another estimate of Ft, which we denote by
F othert = Ft − η (3)
where η is also normally distributed with mean equal to zero. Hence, households’ true
expectation of the government’s fiscal position is given by
F et =
ρF˜ official + ωF othert
ρ+ ω
=
ρF˜ official + ωF˜ official + ωF othert − ωF˜ official
ρ+ ω
= F˜ official +
ω
ρ+ ω
(F othert − F˜ official). (4)
Let γ = ω
ρ+ω
and mt = F
other
t − F˜ official, so we have
F et (mt) = F˜
official + γmt. (5)
The parameter γ captures the level of precision of the news agencies’ announcement with
respect to government’s announcement. Thus, γ = 0 means that news agencies do not lead
financial markets to believe that the government’s creative accounting practices are greater
than it says they are; vice-versa, γ = 1 means that news outlet completely disregard the
government’s announcement and are able to completely sway the opinion of investors about
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creative accounting.
A more transparent government means that the value of m decreases, since the difference
between the two fiscal policy announcement get small. Furthermore, we assume that the
government intends to enact fiscal policy; this means that a higher level of fiscal transparency
decreases the asymmetry of information and households behave optimally, thus gives the
government more freedom and flexibility to allocate money optimally. Therefore, F et (mt) < 0.
Below is a summary of the relationship between m and F et :
• mt = 0⇒ F et (mt) = F˜ official
• mt ↑ ⇒ F et (mt) ≥ F˜ official
• mt ↓ ⇒ F et (mt) ≤ F˜ official.
Asmt decreases, the difference between F
other
t and F˜
official decreases, therefore the government
becomes more transparent with regards to fiscal policy. Intuitively, if the government’s
announcement is clear and concise, i.e. the government is transparent, the news media’s
announcement will closely resemble the one of the government and household will form
belief on fiscal policy that are close enough to the government’s true fiscal position. On the
other hand, if the government is vague and not transparent, then news outlets will all have
different interpretations in the second announcement and the public will form a wide range
of opinions on fiscal policy.
The output equation is derived from the standard dynamic IS curve equation:
yt = y
e
t+1 −
1
σ
(rt − piet+1)− αDt. (6)
This relationship arises from the intertemporal equilibrium condition of a representative
household given its budget constraint (Poutineau et al., 2015). Specifically, the output gap
in period t is a function of the expected output gap in period t+1 and the real interest rate
(rt − piet+1); σ is the risk-aversion parameter. Lastly, dt is government debt in period t, so
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Dt = Gt−Tt (Mathieu and Sterdyniak, 2013). The coefficient α is negative because when Dt
increases the government has to issue bonds to borrow money to repay its debt obligations.
This corresponds to a leftward shift in the supply curve in the loanable funds model, which
causes an increase in interest rates and a decrease in the price of the outstanding bonds.
Therefore, the households that already owned government bonds will get a lower return than
they otherwise would have, thereby decreasing public savings. Recalling the identity ”total
savings = total investment”, we have an overall decrease in output.
We model inflation using a standard Phillips Curve equation:
pit = βpi
e
t+1 + κyt. (7)
This relationship arises from the aggregation of supply decisions by firms that operate under
nomnal price stickiness (Poutineau et al., 2015). Specifically, inflation in period t is a function
of expected inflation in period t+ 1 and the output gap in period t; β is the discount factor
and κ represents the increase in inflation from a one-unit increase in the output gap.
We model government debt using the following equation:
Dt = Dt−1(1 + rt − pit) + θF et (mt). (8)
Government debt in period t depends on government debt in period t−1, accounting for the
real interest rate (1+rt−pit), and the expected fiscal policy as a function of fiscal transparency.
Recall that the quantity mt is the difference between the government’s announcement and
the media’s announcement.
4. Results and Analysis
From equations (6)− (8), we total-differentiate each to get:
dy = dy − 1
σ
dr +
1
σ
dpi − αdD (9)
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dpi = βdpi + κdy (10)
dD = dD(1 + r − pi) +D(dr − dpi) + θFmdm. (11)
In this paper we are interested in the effect of fiscal transparency on output, inflation,
and government debt: dy
dm
, dpi
dm
, and dD
dF
respectively, in order to conduct comparative statics
analysis. Furthermore, since we are interested in the independent effect of fiscal transparency,
we set the change in interest rate equal to 0, that is dr = 0. By re-writing the system of
equations above in matrix form we have

0 − 1
σ
α
−κ 1− β 0
0 0 r − pi


dy
dpi
dD
 =

0
0
θFm∂m
 ,
where the determinant is∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 − 1
σ
α
−κ 1− β 0
0 0 r − pi
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
= −κdα− 1
σ
κ(r − pi) < 0,
provided that r > pi. Note that this is a reasonable assumption, given current levels of
inflation and interest rates.
Using Cramer’s Rule, we have
dy
dm
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 − 1
σ
α
0 1− β 0
θFm 0 r − pi
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
−κdα− 1
σ
κ(r − pi) =
−α(1− β)θFm
−κdα− 1
σ
κ(r − pi) (12)
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dpi
dm
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 0 α
−κ 0 0
0 θFm r − pi
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
−κdα− 1
σ
κ(r − pi) =
−αFm
−dα− 1
σ
(r − pi) (13)
dD
dm
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 − 1
σ
0
−κ 1− β 0
0 d θFm
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
−κdα− 1
σ
κ(r − pi) =
− 1
σ
Fm
−dα− 1
σ
(r − pi) . (14)
From equation (12), recall that we assumed F et (mt) < 0. This implies that as fiscal
transparency increases households are able to form accurate beliefs on the government fiscal
position, which allows it to pass the expansionary policy measures that it desires, which
corresponds to a larger fiscal stimulus, that is Fm < 0. Therefore,
dy
dm
< 0. This means that
a decrease in m, which is an increase in fiscal transparency, leads to an increase in total
output. While a direct relationship between the two variables is not immediately obvious,
the source of this result is probably correlated to the positive externalities brought about
by a more transparent government. This is in fact consistent with the findings of Galois
and Wei (2002) and Teig (2006): a decrease in fiscal opacity most likely decreases the risk
premium associated with financing projects, increases consumer confidence and political
stability. Hameed (2006) also finds that fiscal transparency is positively correlated with
fiscal discipline, which means that the government is able to efficiently allocate money to
meaningful projects, thus stimulating economic activity. The aggregate effect is an increase
in total output.
For the effect of fiscal transparency on inflation we have
dpi
dm
=
−αFm
−Dα− 1
σ
(r − pi) .
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Similar to above, Fm < 0 implies that
dpi
dm
is also negative. Therefore, an increase in fiscal
transparency leads to an increase in inflation as well. This relationship is perhaps even
more indirect than the one with GDP, since it is so heavily influenced by expectations.
When fiscal transparency increases, households expect that expansionary fiscal policy will
stimulate economic activity which will likely help the economy grow, causing inflation to rise.
One the one hand, this result partially agrees with Sargent and Wallace (1989), who argue
that a higher degree of fiscal transparency increases the government trustworthiness and
their ability to effectively stimulate economic activity which leads to an increase inflation.
For reference, they also find that fiscal transparency eases the pressure on the central bank,
especially when it operates under an inflation mandate, which means that it has an even
broader impact on those countries. On the other hand, this result goes against the findings
of Montez and Lima (2018) whose work shows that a higher degree of fiscal transparency
lowers inflation rates and inflation volatility as well as that this effect is stronger in developing
countries.
Finally, for the effect of fiscal transparency on government debt we have
dD
dm
=
− 1
σ
Fm
−Dα− 1
σ
(r − pi) .
Similar to above, Fm < 0 implies that
dD
dm
is also negative. An increase in fiscal transparency
increases the credit ratings and the share of debt owned by foreign creditors, thus allowing
the government to borrow more from the households than it otherwise would; this enhances
the already-present fiscal policy regime, leading to greater government spending and higher
levels of debt (Bastida et al., 2015; Kemoe and Zhan, 2018). This result goes against the
findings of Alt and Lassen (2006) that show that the positive effect of fiscal transparency
on output and revenue is greater than the fiscal burden caused by higher levels of spending;
the net result is therefore a lower government debt.
As per Trinh (2017), “the job of monetary policy is one of managing expectations”. One
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could thus draw a parallel between fiscal transparency and monetary policy transparency,
especially in an economy in which households are able to obtain crucial macroeconomic
information almost instantaneously, thanks to the 24-news cycle. Therefore, in terms of
policy implication under a sovereign default crisis, our model shows that a higher degree
of fiscal transparency increases output and therefore public revenue. Clear signs of fiscal
transparency for the government are the equivalent of forward guidance behavior for the
Federal Reserve. If the government is attempting to reassure and instill confidence in financial
markets, implementing changes to the way in which it goes about relaying information
about its finances can generate tangible benefits. For instance, publishing its fiscal position
more frequently, including more detailed descriptions of its spending, or decreasing (if not
completely eradicating) creative accounting practices are all possible routes to steer the
economy in the right direction. Even though our model shows an increase in the government
budget deficit, this is likely to only be temporary, as the economic growth and the positive
externalities of a transparency are able to restore faith in creditors and households and steer
the government onto the path of debt consolidation in the near future.
5. Conclusion
This paper investigates how fiscal transparency affects output, inflation, and government
debt, with some emphasis on sovereign default scenarios. We find that less fiscal opacity
creates a more favorable environment for the government to conduct expansionary fiscal
policy, which leads to higher GDP, higher inflation, and higher government debt. All three
effects are linked to the government’s increased ability to borrow money in order to stimulate
economic activity.
Significant limitations of these results lie in the numerous assumptions we imposed on a lot
of our variables as well as in the fact that we modeled the economy with only three equations.
We used the notion of creative accounting as a proxy for fiscal transparency, but there are
several other ways to specify the same indicator. Furthermore, a lot of the rationalizations in
our conclusions rely on the results already present in the existing literature, whose theoretical
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(and sometimes empirical) approach is entirely different; that is, we assumed that certain
sectors of the economy, such as financial markets or households, behave the same way they
do in prior research without actually modeling or specifying their incentive structure.
The topic of fiscal transparency is undoubtedly at the forefront of the economic litera-
ture, especially in an environment where the news cycle keeps us updated on current events
every minute of every day. Future theoretical papers studying this issue should consider an
environment which includes more agents with rigorous incentive structures and constraints,
in order to cement the conclusions on solid ground. Moreover, since there does not exist a
rigorous definition of fiscal transparency, further studies should consider modeling it using
more than one indicator and minimize its inherent specification bias.
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